|2.||The Happy Dance Problem|
| post by Abram Demski 62 days ago | Scott Garrabrant and Stuart Armstrong like this | 1 comment|
Since the invention of logical induction, people have been trying to figure out what logically updateless reasoning could be. This is motivated by the idea that, in the realm of Bayesian uncertainty (IE, empirical uncertainty), updateless decision theory is the simple solution to the problem of reflective consistency. Naturally, we’d like to import this success to logically uncertain decision theory.
At a research retreat during the summer, we realized that updateless decision theory wasn’t so easy to define even in the seemingly simple Bayesian case. A possible solution was written up in Conditioning on Conditionals. However, that didn’t end up being especially satisfying.
Here, I introduce the happy dance problem, which more clearly illustrates the difficulty in defining updateless reasoning in the Bayesian case. I also outline Scott’s current thoughts about the correct way of reasoning about this problem.
|3.||Policy Selection Solves Most Problems|
| post by Abram Demski 50 days ago | Alex Appel and Vladimir Slepnev like this | 4 comments|
It seems like logically updateless reasoning is what we would want in order to solve many decision-theory problems. I show that several of the problems which seem to require updateless reasoning can instead be solved by selecting a policy with a logical inductor that’s run a small amount of time. The policy specifies how to make use of knowledge from a logical inductor which is run longer. This addresses the difficulties which seem to block logically updateless decision theory in a fairly direct manner. On the other hand, it doesn’t seem to hold much promise for the kind of insights which we would want from a real solution.
|8.||Smoking Lesion Steelman II|
| post by Abram Demski 109 days ago | Tom Everitt and Scott Garrabrant like this | 1 comment|
After Johannes Treutlein’s comment on Smoking Lesion Steelman, and a number of other considerations, I had almost entirely given up on CDT. However, there were still nagging questions about whether the kind of self-ignorance needed in Smoking Lesion Steelman could arise naturally, how it should be dealt with if so, and what role counterfactuals ought to play in decision theory if CDT-like behavior is incorrect. Today I sat down to collect all the arguments which have been rolling around in my head on this and related issues, and arrived at a place much closer to CDT than I expected.
|9.||Comparing LICDT and LIEDT|
| post by Abram Demski 88 days ago | Alex Appel likes this | discuss|
Attempted versions of CDT and EDT can be constructed using logical inductors, called LICDT and LIEDT. It is shown, however, that LICDT fails XOR Blackmail, and LIEDT fails Newcomb. One interpretation of this is that LICDT and LIEDT do not implement CDT and EDT very well. I argue that they are indeed forms of CDT and EDT, but stray from expectations because they also implement the ratifiability condition I discussed previously. Continuing the line of thinking from that post, I discuss conditions in which LICDT=LIEDT, and try to draw out broader implications for decision theory.
|11.||Smoking Lesion Steelman|
| post by Abram Demski 199 days ago | Tom Everitt, Sam Eisenstat, Vadim Kosoy, Paul Christiano and Scott Garrabrant like this | 8 comments|
It seems plausible to me that any example I’ve seen so far which seems to require causal/counterfactual reasoning is more properly solved by taking the right updateless perspective, and taking the action or policy which achieves maximum expected utility from that perspective. If this were the right view, then the aim would be to construct something like updateless EDT.
I give a variant of the smoking lesion problem which overcomes an objection to the classic smoking lesion, and which is solved correctly by CDT, but which is not solved by updateless EDT.
| post by Abram Demski 232 days ago | Scott Garrabrant and Stuart Armstrong like this | 9 comments|
Robin Hanson’s Futarchy is a proposal to let prediction markets make governmental decisions. We can view an operating Futarchy as an agent, and ask if it is aligned with the interests of its constituents. I am aware of two main failures of alignment: (1) since predicting rare events is rewarded in proportion to their rareness, prediction markets heavily incentivise causing rare events to happen (I’ll call this the entropy-market problem); (2) it seems prediction markets would not be able to assign probability to existential risk, since you can’t collect on bets after everyone’s dead (I’ll call this the existential risk problem). I provide three formulations of (1) and solve two of them, and make some comments on (2). (Thanks to Scott for pointing out the second of these problems to me; I don’t remember who originally told me about the first problem, but also thanks.)
|19.||All Mathematicians are Trollable: Divergence of Naturalistic Logical Updates|
| post by Abram Demski 624 days ago | Jessica Taylor, Patrick LaVictoire, Scott Garrabrant and Vladimir Slepnev like this | 1 comment|
The post on naturalistic logical updates left open the question of whether the probability distribution converges as we condition on more logical information. Here, I show that this cannot always be the case: for any computable probability distribution with naturalistic logical updates, we can show it proofs in an order which will prevent convergence. In fact, at any time, we can drive the probability of \(x\) up or down as much as we like, for a wide variety of sentences \(x\).
As an aid to intuition, I describe the theorem informally as “all mathematicians are trollable”. I was once told that there was an “all mathematicians go to Bayesian hell” theorem, based on the fact that a computable probability distribution must suffer arbitrarily large log-loss when trying to model mathematics. The idea here is similar. We are representing the belief state of a mathematician with a computable probability distribution, and trying to manipulate that belief state by proving carefully-selected theorems to the mathematician.