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by Paul Christiano 125 days ago | link | parent

If I want my boat to travel with the wind, I have two options:

  1. Add some sensors to detect the direction of the wind, and a motor to propel the boat in that direction.
  2. Add a sail.

I suspect the analog of approach #2 will work much better for corrigibility.



by Stuart Armstrong 120 days ago | link

Not sure what your argument is. Can you develop it?

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by Paul Christiano 118 days ago | link

I expect a workable approach will define the operator implicitly as “that thing which has control over the input channel” rather than by giving an explicit definition. This is analogous to the way in which a sail causes your boat to move with the wind: you don’t have to define or measure the wind precisely, you just have to be easily pushed around by it.

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by Stuart Armstrong 112 days ago | link

Thus anything that can control the operator becomes defined as the operator? That doesn’t seem safe…

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by Paul Christiano 111 days ago | link

The AI defers to anything that can control the operator.

If the operator has physical control over the AI, than any process which controls the operator can replace the AI wholesale. It feels fine to defer to such processes, and certainly it seems much better than the situation where the operator is attempting to correct the AI’s behavior but the AI is paternalistically unresponsive.

Presumably the operator will try to secure themselves in the same way that they try to secure their AI.

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by Stuart Armstrong 111 days ago | link

This also means that if the AI can figure out a way of controlling the controller, then it is itself in control form the moment it comes up with a reasonable plan?

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by Paul Christiano 110 days ago | link

The AI replacing the operator is certainly a fixed point.

This doesn’t seem any different from the usual situation. Modifying your goals is always a fixed point. That doesn’t mean that our agents will inevitably do it.

An agent which is doing what the operator wants, where the operator is “whatever currently has physical control of the AI,” won’t try to replace the operator—because that’s not what the operator wants.

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by Stuart Armstrong 110 days ago | link

An agent which is doing what the operator wants, where the operator is “whatever currently has physical control of the AI,” won’t try to replace the operator—because that’s not what the operator wants.

I disagree (though we may be interpreting that sentence differently). Once the AI has the possibility of subverting the controller, then it is, in effect, in physical control of itself. So it itself becomes the “formal operator”, and, depending on how it’s motivated, is perfectly willing to replace the “human operator”, whose wishes are now irrelevant (because it’s no longer the formal operator).

And this never involves any goal modification at all - it’s the same goal, except that the change in control has changed the definition of the operator.

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