 Distributed Cooperation   post by Alex Appel 8 hours ago  Abram Demski likes this  2 comments  
 Reflective oracles can be approximated by computing Nash equilibria. But is there some procedure that produces a Paretooptimal equilibrium in a game, aka, a point produced by a Cooperative oracle? It turns out there is. There are some interesting philosophical aspects to it, which will be typed up in the next post.
The result is not original to me, it’s been floating around MIRI for a while. I think Scott, Sam, and Abram worked on it, but there might have been others. All I did was formalize it a bit, and generalize from the 2player 2move case to the nplayer nmove case. With the formalism here, it’s a bit hard to intuitively understand what’s going on, so I’ll indicate where to visualize an appropriate 3dimensional object.
 
        An Untrollable Mathematician   post by Abram Demski 53 days ago  Alex Appel, Sam Eisenstat, Vadim Kosoy, Jack Gallagher, Jessica Taylor, Paul Christiano, Scott Garrabrant and Vladimir Slepnev like this  1 comment  
 Followup to All Mathematicians are Trollable.
It is relatively easy to see that no computable Bayesian prior on logic can converge to a single coherent probability distribution as we update it on logical statements. Furthermore, the nonconvergence behavior is about as bad as could be: someone selecting the ordering of provable statements to update on can drive the Bayesian’s beliefs arbitrarily up or down, arbitrarily many times, despite only saying true things. I called this wild nonconvergence behavior “trollability”. Previously, I showed that if the Bayesian updates on the provabilily of a sentence rather than updating on the sentence itself, it is still trollable. I left open the question of whether some other side information could save us. Sam Eisenstat has closed this question, providing a simple logical prior and a way of doing a Bayesian update on it which (1) cannot be trolled, and (2) converges to a coherent distribution.
 
   More precise regret bound for DRL   post by Vadim Kosoy 85 days ago  Alex Appel likes this  discuss  
 We derive a regret bound for DRL reflecting dependence on:
That is, the regret bound we get is fully explicit up to a multiplicative constant (which can also be made explicit). Currently we focus on plain (as opposed to catastrophe) and uniform (finite number of hypotheses, uniform prior) DRL, although this result can and should be extended to the catastrophe and/or nonuniform settings.
 
    Being legible to other agents by committing to using weaker reasoning systems   post by Alex Mennen 105 days ago  Stuart Armstrong and Vladimir Slepnev like this  1 comment  
 Suppose that an agent \(A_{1}\) reasons in a sound theory \(T_{1}\), and an agent \(A_{2}\) reasons in a theory \(T_{2}\), such that \(T_{1}\) proves that \(T_{2}\) is sound. Now suppose \(A_{1}\) is trying to reason in a way that is legible to \(A_{2}\), in the sense that \(A_{2}\) can rely on \(A_{1}\) to reach correct conclusions. One way of doing this is for \(A_{1}\) to restrict itself to some weaker theory \(T_{3}\), which \(T_{2}\) proves is sound, for the purposes of any reasoning that it wants to be legible to \(A_{2}\). Of course, in order for this to work, not only would \(A_{1}\) have to restrict itself to using \(T_{3}\), but \(A_{2}\) would to trust that \(A_{1}\) had done so. A plausible way for that to happen is for \(A_{1}\) to reach the decision quickly enough that \(A_{2}\) can simulate \(A_{1}\) making the decision to restrict itself to using \(T_{3}\).  
    Policy Selection Solves Most Problems   post by Abram Demski 110 days ago  Alex Appel and Vladimir Slepnev like this  4 comments  
 It seems like logically updateless reasoning is what we would want in order to solve many decisiontheory problems. I show that several of the problems which seem to require updateless reasoning can instead be solved by selecting a policy with a logical inductor that’s run a small amount of time. The policy specifies how to make use of knowledge from a logical inductor which is run longer. This addresses the difficulties which seem to block logically updateless decision theory in a fairly direct manner. On the other hand, it doesn’t seem to hold much promise for the kind of insights which we would want from a real solution.
 
    Catastrophe Mitigation Using DRL   post by Vadim Kosoy 120 days ago  3 comments  
 Previously we derived a regret bound for DRL which assumed the advisor is “locally sane.” Such an advisor can only take actions that don’t lose any value in the long term. In particular, if the environment contains a latent catastrophe that manifests with a certain rate (such as the possibility of an UFAI), a locally sane advisor has to take the optimal course of action to mitigate it, since every delay yields a positive probability of the catastrophe manifesting and leading to permanent loss of value. This state of affairs is unsatisfactory, since we would like to have performance guarantees for an AI that can mitigate catastrophes that the human operator cannot mitigate on their own. To address this problem, we introduce a new form of DRL where in every hypothetical environment the set of uncorrupted states is divided into “dangerous” (impending catastrophe) and “safe” (catastrophe was mitigated). The advisor is then only required to be locally sane in safe states, whereas in dangerous states certain “leaking” of longterm value is allowed. We derive a regret bound in this setting as a function of the time discount factor, the expected value of catastrophe mitigation time for the optimal policy, and the “value leak” rate (i.e. essentially the rate of catastrophe occurrence). The form of this regret bound implies that in certain asymptotic regimes, the agent attains nearoptimal expected utility (and in particular mitigates the catastrophe with probability close to 1), whereas the advisor on its own fails to mitigate the catastrophe with probability close to 1.
 
  The Happy Dance Problem   post by Abram Demski 121 days ago  Scott Garrabrant and Stuart Armstrong like this  1 comment  
 Since the invention of logical induction, people have been trying to figure out what logically updateless reasoning could be. This is motivated by the idea that, in the realm of Bayesian uncertainty (IE, empirical uncertainty), updateless decision theory is the simple solution to the problem of reflective consistency. Naturally, we’d like to import this success to logically uncertain decision theory.
At a research retreat during the summer, we realized that updateless decision theory wasn’t so easy to define even in the seemingly simple Bayesian case. A possible solution was written up in Conditioning on Conditionals. However, that didn’t end up being especially satisfying.
Here, I introduce the happy dance problem, which more clearly illustrates the difficulty in defining updateless reasoning in the Bayesian case. I also outline Scott’s current thoughts about the correct way of reasoning about this problem.
 
  Reflective oracles as a solution to the converse Lawvere problem   post by Sam Eisenstat 122 days ago  Alex Mennen, Alex Appel, Vadim Kosoy, Abram Demski, Jessica Taylor, Scott Garrabrant and Vladimir Slepnev like this  discuss  
 1 Introduction
Before the work of Turing, one could justifiably be skeptical of the idea of a universal computable function. After all, there is no computable function \(f\colon\mathbb{N}\times\mathbb{N}\to\mathbb{N}\) such that for all computable \(g\colon\mathbb{N}\to\mathbb{N}\) there is some index \(i_{g}\) such that \(f\left(i_{g},n\right)=g\left(n\right)\) for all \(n\). If there were, we could pick \(g\left(n\right)=f\left(n,n\right)+1\), and then \[g\left(i_{g}\right)=f\left(i_{g},i_{g}\right)+1=g\left(i_{g}\right)+1,\] a contradiction. Of course, universal Turing machines don’t run into this obstacle; as Gödel put it, “By a kind of miracle it is not necessary to distinguish orders, and the diagonal procedure does not lead outside the defined notion.” [1]
The miracle of Turing machines is that there is a partial computable function \(f\colon\mathbb{N}\times\mathbb{N}\to\mathbb{N}\cup\left\{ \bot\right\}\) such that for all partial computable \(g\colon\mathbb{N}\to\mathbb{N}\cup\left\{ \bot\right\}\) there is an index \(i\) such that \(f\left(i,n\right)=g\left(n\right)\) for all \(n\). Here, we look at a different “miracle”, that of reflective oracles [2,3]. As we will see in Theorem 1, given a reflective oracle \(O\), there is a (stochastic) \(O\)computable function \(f\colon\mathbb{N}\times\mathbb{N}\to\left\{ 0,1\right\}\) such that for any (stochastic) \(O\)computable function \(g\colon\mathbb{N}\to\left\{ 0,1\right\}\), there is some index \(i\) such that \(f\left(i,n\right)\) and \(g\left(n\right)\) have the same distribution for all \(n\). This existence theorem seems to skirt even closer to the contradiction mentioned above.
We use this idea to answer “in spirit” the converse Lawvere problem posed in [4]. These methods also generalize to prove a similar analogue of the ubiquitous converse Lawvere problem from [5]. The original questions, stated in terms of topology, remain open, but I find that the model proposed here, using computability, is equally satisfying from the point of view of studying reflective agents. Those references can be consulted for more motivation on these problems from the perspective of reflective agency.
Section 3 proves the main lemma, and proves the converse Lawvere theorem for reflective oracles. In section 4, we use that to give a (circular) proof of Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, as mentioned in [4]. In section 5, we prove the ubiquitous converse Lawvere theorem for reflective oracles.
 
     Reward learning summary   post by Stuart Armstrong 131 days ago  discuss  
 A putative new idea for AI control; index here.
I’ve been posting a lot on value/reward learning recently, and, as usual, the process of posting (and some feedback) means that those posts are partially superseded already  and some of them are overly complex.
So here I’ll try and briefly summarise my current insights, with links to the other posts if appropriate (a link will cover all the points noted since the previous link):
 
 
Older 
 NEW POSTSNEW DISCUSSION POSTSIf you drop the
by Alex Appel on Distributed Cooperation  0 likes 
Cool! I'm happy to see this
Caveat: The version of EDT
by 258 on In memoryless Cartesian environments, every UDT po...  2 likes 
[Delegative Reinforcement
by Vadim Kosoy on Stable Pointers to Value II: Environmental Goals  1 like 
Intermediate update:
The
by Alex Appel on Further Progress on a Bayesian Version of Logical ...  0 likes 
Since Briggs [1] shows that
by 258 on In memoryless Cartesian environments, every UDT po...  2 likes 
This doesn't quite work. The
by Nisan Stiennon on Logical counterfactuals and differential privacy  0 likes 
I at first didn't understand
This is somewhat related to
by Vadim Kosoy on The set of Logical Inductors is not Convex  0 likes 
This uses logical inductors
by Abram Demski on The set of Logical Inductors is not Convex  0 likes 
Nice writeup. Is oneboxing
Hi Alex!
The definition of
by Vadim Kosoy on Delegative Inverse Reinforcement Learning  0 likes 
A summary that might be
by Alex Appel on Delegative Inverse Reinforcement Learning  1 like 
I don't believe that
by Alex Appel on Delegative Inverse Reinforcement Learning  0 likes 
This is exactly the sort of
by Stuart Armstrong on Being legible to other agents by committing to usi...  0 likes 
